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Executive Compensation
in EREITs: EREIT Size
is but One Determinant
William G. Hardin, III*
Abstract. Prior research of senior executive compensation in real estate investment trusts
(REITs) has found REIT size as the sole statistically signiﬁcant determinant of
compensation. This research ﬁnds that size is only one of several determinants of equity
REITs (EREIT) senior executive compensation. In addition to size as measured by
EREIT market value, the designation of the EREIT as a retail EREIT, the percentage
of stock owned by the senior executive, the dollar amount of dividends paid to the senior
executive and the number of years since an EREIT’s initial public offering were found
to be signiﬁcant factors impacting senior executive compensation. The results also
contrast with the general executive compensation literature that shows proxies for size
as the primary determinants of executive compensation. This research indicates the need
for industry speciﬁc compensation models to account for variation in executive
compensation.
Introduction
Because of the substantial gap between the compensation of senior corporate
executives and the wages of non-executive corporate employees, the compensation of
senior corporate executives continues to be subject to harsh criticism (Byrne, 1996).
Since ﬁrm size has generally been the primary determinant of senior executive
compensation (Ciscel and Carroll, 1980; Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt, 1991; and
Davis and Shelor, 1995) and ﬁrm stock performance has generally not been shown to
affect compensation, additional industry speciﬁc empirical research is needed.
Unlike most prior studies of senior executive compensation, this study uses only one
industry and one type of corporate entity to generate a sample frame. By only using
equity real estate investment trusts (EREITs), the extraneous variation in executive
compensation that is inherent in most prior studies using samples from related, but
differing industries is eliminated. The large number of publicly traded EREITs allows
for a clearer analysis of the relationship between executive compensation and industry
speciﬁc corporate performance measures.
Literature Review
The executive compensation literature has focused on ﬁrm size as the major
determinant of senior executive compensation. Baumol’s (1959) postulate that larger
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corporate operations increase the scope of a business with a resultant positive
correlation between corporate revenues and executive compensation has served as the
primary basis for most executive compensation research. The operationalization of
corporate size, however, has been problematic with researchers using proxies such as
sales revenue and net income. Lewellan and Huntsman (1970) showed net income to
be a greater determinant of senior executive compensation than revenue. Ciscel and
Carroll (1980) found that net income is the key determinant of executive
compensation. Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) and Murphy (1985) showed that revenue
and stock performance inﬂuence senior executive compensation. Leonard (1990)
found a relationship between ﬁrm revenue and executive compensation that was
subsequently conﬁrmed by Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt (1991). Lambert, Larcker
and Weigelt also showed that a change in revenue is not signiﬁcant in determining
executive compensation. Bartlett, Grant and Miller (1992) found net proﬁt, revenue,
and a ﬁrm’s beta to be determinants of senior executive compensation while Ely
(1991) showed that there are inter-industry differences in the determinants of senior
executive compensation.
The study of senior real estate executive compensation has been minimal. Davis and
Shelor (1995) showed ﬁrm size, as measured by total assets, and earnings per share
to be determinants of executive compensation. A subsequent study by Chopin,
Dickens and Shelor (1995) found a relationship between net income and REIT
executive compensation, but did not examine the relationship between either REIT
market value or funds from operations (FFO), more common measures of REIT
operating performance and executive compensation. The use of an EREIT-speciﬁc
sample and EREIT-speciﬁc measures of performance allows for a more detailed
examination of the speciﬁc determinants of EREIT executive compensation than has
previously been attempted.
Data
The 1995 National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) REIT
Handbook was used to generate the sample frame. All nonspecialty EREITs with
market capitalizations of $90M were included in the sample frame. Eighty-seven
REITs were identiﬁed. A year end 1994 Annual Report, Proxy Statement and 10-K
were requested from each EREIT. Eighty-three companies responded. Of the eighty-
three responses, sixty-eight provided sufﬁcient data for inclusion in the study.
The total market capitalization of the usable sample was $28.436B. This represented
80% of the total market value of nonspecialty EREITs at year end 1994. The sixty-
eight EREITs in the usable sample represented 77% of the total number of EREITs
identiﬁed having individual market capitalizations of greater than $90M. Exhibits
1–3 summarize the sample’s composition by property type, presence of the
EREIT’s founder as the corporation’s senior executive and date of initial public
offering. Apartment and retail EREITs were the two property types with the most
representation in the sample. Forty-six EREITs or 68% of the EREITs in the sample
were taken public in 1993 or 1994. Fifty-one EREITs or 75% were managed by
company founders. Founder-managed EREIT market value totaled $19.912B.EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN EREITS 403
Exhibit 1
EREIT Sample Statistics by Property Type





Retail 22 32.3 8,464,100 29.8
Apartment 20 29.4 7,776,400 27.3
Ofﬁce 7 10.3 2,264,200 8.0
Industrial 3 4.4 818,500 2.9
Mall 5 7.4 5,207,000 18.3
Mixed 8 11.8 2,703,900 9.5
Outlet 3 4.4 1,202,000 4.2
Total 68 100.0 28,436,100 100.0
Exhibits 4 and 5 provide descriptive information on the speciﬁc variables included in
the compensation model. The mean salary for an EREIT’s senior executive ofﬁcer
was $250,162, with a mean cash incentive of $69,853. Total cash compensation
averaged $320,015, with a range of $100,000 to $998,000. The mean market value
of the EREITs was $418M, with a range of $94M to $2.1B. The mean percentage
ownership of the EREIT by the senior corporate executive was 6.7% with a range of
0% to 35%. The mean dividend cash ﬂow to the senior executive was $2.526M with
a range of $0 to $34.605M. Senior executives of mall EREITs had the highest mean
salary ($365,600), while senior executives of ofﬁce EREITs had the lowest mean
salary ($184,143). Senior executives of mall EREITs had the highest mean total
compensation ($424,200), while senior executives of industrial EREITs had the lowest
mean total compensation ($195,333).
Model
The model of EREIT senior executive compensation used in this study is as follows:
COMP 5 ƒ(MVA, APART, RETAIL, FOUNDER, IPO, %OWN, DCFLOW),
where:
COMP 5 Senior executive salary, cash bonus and cash incentives;
MVA 5 Market value of the EREIT;
APART 5 1 if the REIT is an apartment REIT, 0 if otherwise;
RETAIL 5 1 if the REIT is a retail REIT, 0 if otherwise;
FOUNDER 5 1, if founder, 0 otherwise;
IPO 5 The number of years since the REIT’s IPO with 1994 being 1;
%OWN 5 The senior manager’s percentage ownership of the REIT; and
DCFLOW 5 The dividend cash ﬂow to the senior executive.
Compensation (COMP), the model’s dependent variable, is deﬁned as salary plus cash404 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 2
EREIT Sample Statistics by Presence of Founder





Retail 22 14 64 5,458,500 65
Apartment 20 15 75 4,966,700 64
Ofﬁce 7 6 86 2,136,100 94
Industrial 3 3 100 818,500 100
Mall 5 4 80 3,123,700 58
Mixed 8 6 75 2,206,100 82
Outlet 3 3 100 1,202,000 100
Total 68 51 75 19,911,600 70
Exhibit 3
EREIT Sample Statistics by Date of IPO
Property Type Number 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 Pre-1989
Retail 22 1 9 2 2 0 0 8
Apartment 20 10 8 0 0 0 0 2
Ofﬁce 7 4 1 0 0 0 0 2
Industrial 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
Mall 5 2 2 1 0 0 0 0
Mixed 8 0 3 0 0 0 0 5
Outlet 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
Total 68 21 25 3 2 0 0 17
bonuses and incentives. Support for this deﬁnition comes from research by Lewellan
and Huntsman (1970) showing that the salary plus bonus deﬁnition of compensation
is a sufﬁcient proxy for total compensation. Additionally, the use of the salary plus
cash bonus deﬁnition of compensation follows Jensen and Murphy (1990), Lambert,
Larcker and Weigelt (1991), Bartlett, Grant and Miller (1992), Chopin, Dickens and
Shelor (1995) and Davis and Shelor (1995).
Since prior empirical studies indicate that ﬁrm size is the primary determinant of
executive compensation in REITs, EREIT market value (MVA) is incorporated into
the model as the proxy for ﬁrm size. Although Chopin, Dickens and Shelor (1995)
used net income as a proxy for size and performance, and found a relationship
between net income and compensation, it is not used in this model because the MVA
variable is a better measure of the underlying value of the real estate portfolio from
which economic returns are generated and net income is not a generally accepted
measure of REIT performance. The use of EREIT market value also addresses CiscelEXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN EREITS 405
Exhibit 4
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Salary 250,162 126,324 100,000 750,000
Bonus 69,853 81,835 0 327,000
COMP 320,015 172,569 100,000 998,000
MVA (’000) 418,178 578,373 94,000 2,083,300
APART 0.32 0.47 0 1
RETAIL 0.29 0.46 0 1
FOUNDER 0.75 0.44 0 1
IPO (years) 6.91 10.41 1 35
%OWN 0.07 0.08 0 0.35
DCFLOW (’000) 2,526 4,825 0 34,605
and Carroll’s (1980) theoretical concern that compensation models depart from
economic theory by using net income as an independent variable when in fact net
income is derived from a ﬁrm’s assets and their utilization.
Industry speciﬁc variables incorporated into the model include the length of time since
the EREIT’s IPO (IPO), the percentage of outstanding stock owned by the EREIT’s
senior executive (%OWN), the dividend cash ﬂow paid to the senior executive or
afﬁliated entities (DCFLOW), a dummy variable indicating that the senior executive
is the EREIT’s founder (FOUNDER) and dummy variables for the two largest EREIT
property types, apartments (APART) and retail (RETAIL). The IPO variable is used to
capture the relationship between time since the IPO and the senior executive’s salary.
Since REITs are required to pay dividends equivalent to 95% of net income, capital
formation is difﬁcult without secondary stock issuances. A positive relationship
between compensation and time since the IPO is anticipated as initial ownership is
diluted, but needed management skills are expanded requiring additional
compensation. The %OWN and DCFLOW variables reﬂect the fact that 75% of senior
executives are EREIT founders and retain substantial ownership interests in the newly
public EREITs. The relationship between compensation and the percentage of
outstanding stock owned by the senior executive is ambiguous as substantial executive
ownership may allow the senior executive to inﬂuence the amount and type of
compensation paid. There, however, should be a negative relationship between
compensation and dividend payments. Because REITs are not taxed at the corporate
level, there would be no tax beneﬁt to the senior executive for taking an increase in
salary in lieu of dividend income. Therefore, a negative relationship is hypothesized.
The dummy variable for founder captures any impact derived from the founder’s
inﬂuence over his post-IPO compensation package. Because 68% of the EREITs in
the sample completed their initial public offerings within a twenty-four month period
prior to ﬁscal year end 1994, this variable captures any pre-IPO salary effect on post-
IPO salary. The APART and RETAIL dummy variables are incorporated into the model406 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 5
Compensation in Dollars by Property Type
Property Type n Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Retail 22
Salary 292,591 130,921 109,000 665,000
Bonus 95,409 93,642 0 327,000
Total COMP 388,000 183,819 109,000 827,000
Apartment 20
Salary 203,350 67,035 100,000 350,000
Bonus 55,900 63,385 0 200,000
Total COMP 259,250 112,246 100,000 498,000
Ofﬁce 7
Salary 184,143 75,311 125,000 350,000
Bonus 82,571 72,461 0 229,000
Total COMP 266,714 144,787 125,000 579,000
Industrial 3
Salary 185,000 35,000 145,000 210,000
Bonus 10,333 15,373 0 28,000
Total COMP 195,333 19,655 173,000 210,000
Mall 5
Salary 365,600 241,712 175,000 750,000
Bonus 58,600 107,656 0 248,000
Total COMP 424,200 345,800 175,000 998,000
Mixed 8
Salary 274,125 139,185 150,000 591,000
Bonus 47,625 68,727 0 180,000
Total COMP 321,750 129,639 150,000 591,000
Outlet 3
Salary 214,000 90,072 150,000 317,000
Bonus 83,333 144,338 0 250,000
Total COMP 297,333 113,782 175,000 400,000
to determine the effect of property type on compensation. This is warranted based on
NAREIT’s and real estate analysts’ traditional delineation of investment by property
type. No other real estate property types were of sufﬁcient size to warrant individual
classiﬁcation.
Empirical Results
Ordinary least squares regression results are presented in Exhibit 6. With the exception
of APART and FOUNDER, all variables are signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The model
accounts for approximately 55% of the variation in senior executive compensation,
which is a substantial improvement over Davis and Shelor’s 26% (1995). As expected,
the coefﬁcient for MVA is positive and highly signiﬁcant (p-value of .001). This
conﬁrms past empirical studies showing a positive relationship between real estate
ﬁrm size and senior executive compensation. The RETAIL coefﬁcient is positive and
signiﬁcant (p-value of .027), while the coefﬁcient for APART is not statisticallyEXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN EREITS 407
Exhibit 6
Regression Results
Variable Coeff. t-Stat. p-Value
Intercept 164.415 3.2 .0020
MVA ,0.001 7.4 .0001
APART 214.023 20.4 .7016
RETAIL 78.230 2.3 .0274
FOUNDER 263.941 21.6 .1155
IPO 4.336 2.8 .0069
%OWN 558.343 1.8 .0787
DCFLOW 20.012 22.5 .0147
Note: The dependent variable is COMP; R2 5 .5962; Adjusted R2 5 .5491; F-Value 5 12.66;
Probability 2 Value 5 .0001; and N 5 68.
signiﬁcant. The senior executives of retail EREITs are paid a premium of
approximately $78,231. The FOUNDER variable is only marginally signiﬁcant with
a p-value of .116. It is possible that the %OWN and DCFLOW variables partially
capture the relationship between compensation and founder status as the founders
have larger ownership stakes and dividend cash ﬂow than non-founding senior
executives. The coefﬁcient of %OWN is positive and statistically signiﬁcant (p-value
of .079) indicating a positive relationship between stock ownership and compensation
while the coefﬁcient of the DCFLOW variable is negative and signiﬁcant (p-value of
.013) as expected. For every 1% of ownership in outstanding common shares,
compensation increases by $5,583. An increase of $10,000 in senior executive
dividend income, however, decreases compensation by $125. The coefﬁcient of the
IPO variable is positive and signiﬁcant (p-value of .007) which lends support to the
postulate that the ownership dilution required for growth after an IPO requires
additional pay to compensate a senior executive for experience and increased
management skill.
The model evidences no problems with the underlying assumptions required for the
use of OLS regression. To quantify potential multicollinearity between the
independent variables in the model, a major issue in most compensation studies,
variance inﬂation factors (VIFs) were generated. Using criteria from Neter, Wasserman
and Kutner (1990), the VIFs indicate no multicollinearity problems. Additionally,
White’s test (1980) indicates that the model is not heteroskedastic (p-value of .556)
and the Shapiro-Wilks test statistic generated by SAS (p-value of .975) indicates that
the residual error terms are normally distributed.
Conclusion
By incorporating variables that reﬂect EREIT industry characteristics, substantially
more of the variation in senior executive compensation was modeled than in previous408 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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research. In addition to ﬁrm size as measured by the market value of an EREIT, the
designation of the EREIT as a retail EREIT, the percentage of stock owned by the
senior executive, the dollar amount of dividends paid to the senior executive and the
number of years since an EREIT’s IPO were found to be signiﬁcant determinants of
senior executive compensation. This is an important ﬁnding because prior studies have
only been able to consistently show a relationship between ﬁrm size and senior
executive compensation.
The research also highlights the need for industry speciﬁc compensation models that
take into account inter-industry differences in capital structure, ownership structure
and risk. It is very probable that the low explanatory power of prior compensation
models can be traced to poorly speciﬁed models. The development of better
compensation models at the industry level is a prerequisite to any meaningful
discussion of executive compensation. The relative homogeneity of the EREIT
industry segment will allow it to be a focal point for additional research on executive
compensation.
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